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ABSTRACT
There is a great interest in cost-effective, reliable and state-of-the-art computing performance for science payloads
on nanosatellite missions. Highly integrated system architectures combine reconfigurable System-on-Chip (SoC)
devices, memory as well as peripheral interfaces in a single System-on-Module (SoM) and offer low resource
requirements regarding power/mass, but moderate to high processing power capabilities. The major advantages
of these architectures are flexibility, (re)programmability, modularity and module reuse. However, it is a challenge
to use radiation sensitive SoM with COTS based memories devices in a low Earth orbit (LEO).
In order to fulfill the requirements, we developed a remote sensing instrument for atmospheric temperature
measurements with mitigation measures, using redundant memory devices and in-flight reconfiguration. The
hardware is based on the Xilinx Zynq-7000 SoM with minimal amount of external components. A supervisor
circuit is used to manage save booting from alternative and redundant memory devices and initiates eventtriggered reconfiguration of the system. The approach distinguishes between programmable logic and processing
system reconfiguration, and enables in-flight firmware updates in the event of errors changing measurement
conditions.
INTRODUCTION
Nanosatellites have evolved over the past 20 years and
are no longer just demonstration platforms; they are
also used for scientific applications. For example,
small scientific instruments with imaging systems,
earth observation platforms and remote sensing
instruments have been built for in-orbitdemonstration-and-verification missions with short
mission duration [1-4]. Recently, scientific long-term
measurements with such as remote sensing
instruments become increasingly important for the
modeling of the climate system [5]. This leads to a
great interest for cost-effective reliable payload
electronics with short development time and
maximum performance.
Applications with high-resolution, high-speed imaging
instruments, acquisition sequence control and image
processing (e.g. data compression) force strong realtime requirements on the payload design. Highly
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integrated circuits with reconfigurable logic, similar to
field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), combined
with multi core processing architectures in a Systemon-Chip (SoC) device were introduced for COTS
based instruments [6] and suitable for online
processing tasks and reduction of the system data rates.
The next step in high level integration combines SoC,
memory and peripheral interfaces in a System-onModule (SoM) and offer low resource requirements
regarding power and mass, but moderate to high
processing power capabilities. The major advantages
of
these
architectures
are
flexibility,
(re)programmability, modularity and module reuse.
However, it is a challenge to use SoM with COTS
based components in a radiation sensitive
environment, to protect it against Single Event Effects
(SEEs) and Total Ionized Dose (TID). SEEs may cause
both instantaneous and long-term damages in
electronic systems. Instantaneous damages are the
well-studied SEUs and SETs [7]; long-term damages
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are usually caused by the TID, i.e., the accumulation
of charge trapped in the oxide layer of transistors in
CMOS circuits. TID first causes degradation of the
performance of the system, and ultimately it may cause
failures [8]. For these reasons, space is considered a
challenging environment. On the one hand, the
electronics systems need special mechanisms to
mitigate radiations that can compromise the platform
(i.e., there is the need of a high reliable system) [9]; on
the other hand, a space mission needs a strong planning
phase, which permits utilizing a system for long-term
measurements (i.e., need reconfigure the system).
In order to improve the reliability for long-term
measurements, additional mitigation measures, such as
the use of redundant or alternative memory devices for
firmware storage and flexible in-flight reconfiguration
builds further essential measures. A simplified
solution with a minimal effort in additional
components will be described here. We utilize the
advantage of SoMs, where several different memory
devices are available, to realize redundant
configuration and boot media, which detect defective
configurations by self-checking and bypass them. A
distinction is made between cold and warm
redundancy with minimal additional components
around the SoM. In-flight firmware updates can also
be used to rewrite defective configurations, to program
new measurement programs and parameters, and setup
additional measurement procedures. In this process,
the limited uplink time is taken into account splitting
the boot image into partitions.
In this paper, we first introduce the remote sensing
device and its configuration hardware and describe the
reconfiguration strategy. Next, we describe the
realization of the protection circuits and their
implementation. Finally, the results on self-diagnosis
and fault tolerance to memory failures during
environmental tests are presented.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
AtmoLITE Remote Sensing Instrument
The Atmospheric Limb Interferometer for
Temperature Exploration (AtmoLITE) is a highly
miniaturized limb sounder utilizing a monolithic
spatial heterodyne interferometer for day and
nighttime atmospheric temperature sounding. It is
developed as a science payload for the Atmospheric
Coupling and Dynamics Explorer (ARCADE) mission
scheduled in Q4 2022 inside the International Satellite
Program in Research and Education (INSPIRE) series
of satellites [10]. Atmospheric temperature profiles are
obtained by limb-sounding O2 A-Band emissions at a
wavelength of 762 nm from a low Earth orbit. It is a
complete remote sensing instrument with optics,
detector, electronics, structure, as well as a radiator
and designed for 6U CubeSat [11]. Figure 1 gives an
overview of the AtmoLITE design and components.
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Figure 1: AtmoLITE instrument components.
Light enters the instrument through the baffle and a
band pass filter. The front optics focuses the
atmospheric scene onto the gratings of the spatial
heterodyne interferometer (SHI). The light is dispersed
at the gratings and forms a fringe pattern at the exit of
the interferometer. The detector optics images this
fringe pattern onto the two-dimensional Limb
Sounding Detector (LSD) in CMOS technology. The
detector image provides spectral and spatial
information simultaneously [12]. The interferogram is
encoded in the direction perpendicular to the grating
grooves. The dimension parallel to the grating grooves
contains the spatial information, which shall be the
vertical profile of the atmospheric scene. The field of
view (FOV) of the sounder is ~2°, which corresponds
to an altitude range of approximate 60 km at the limb.
The region of interest is in the Mesosphere and Lower
Thermosphere (MLT) between 60 km and 120 km.
The two-dimensional limb-sounding detector is
operated by a proximity electronics (PXE), which
sends the data to the front-end electronics (FEE),
which handles the communication with the satellite,
provides housekeeping data, control measurement
operation and parameter adjustment. The system
controller of the FEE is based on a SRAM-based
Xilinx Zynq-7000 System-on-Module (SoM)
architecture. This module is a board-level circuit that
combines reconfigurable hardware as programmable
logic with a processing unit, memory and peripheral
interfaces in a single module. It represents a high-level
design by including special functions (e.g., data
processing, data compression and interface control)
and deliver flexibility and reliability in terms of
measurement
parameterizing,
in-flight
(re)programmability, modularity and module reuse.
In-flight Reconfiguration
Reconfiguration is interesting in space missions and
can be performed in both on-ground and in-flight
scenarios; in the first case, the SoM can be configured
at later phases of the development of space system; in
the second case, it can be reconfigured after the launch.
In addition, the SoM can be reconfigured with a
different application once it is needed. Furthermore,
the system can embed self-healing mechanisms, which
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can recover the SRAM-based functionality once a SEE
or a permanent fault occurs.

files. This allows an independent upload of each
partition and partly changed reconfiguration image.

For in-flight reconfiguration several communication
interfaces are available at the SoM. In combination
with a customized communication protocol, inspired
by the CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) [13], several
physical layer technologies, like CAN, I2C, serial (RS232, RS-485), SpaceWire and Ethernet TCP/IP are
supported. This offers flexibility during the
development phase and modularity in case of different
satellite bus interfaces. A typical configuration is
shown Figure 2. The on-board computer (OBC)
handles all communication with the ground or control
station. This can be routed over a radio RF-Band or,
for laboratory use and ground testing, with a direct
network connection. The OBC forwards the
configuration packages, commands and controls each
payload using different communication channels.

Reconfiguration Strategy
Reconfiguration strategies e.g. partial dynamic
reconfiguration and scrubbing techniques can offer
increased fault tolerance in the FPGA-based SoMs and
were investigated by several groups [14, 15].
However, fine-grained, non-invasive fault detection in
the FPGA fabric is challenging [16] and can be
simplified if instantaneous failures (soft errors) can be
tolerated by SEEs during operation. In the case of the
presented remote sensing instrument, a global
coverage for measurements over several seasons is
aimed to study the climatic long-term effects [5], a
continuous operation as in space computers where the
malfunction leads to the loss of the mission is not
required.
Our soft- and hard-error mitigation strategy are aimed
into a reconfiguration on demand to compensate for
SEU and SEFI induced errors and a safe shutdown at
SEL events. Instead of blind scrubbing [15], we are
using an event-triggered diagnostic to initiate a
complete reconfiguration by rebooting the system. As
the particle flux in LEO orbit is quite low, scrubbing
intervals can be kept very low, e.g. once per orbit [9].
Therefore, our concept replacing continuous scrubbing
by reconfiguration on a detected diagnostics error. The
diagnostic part consists of a built-in-self-test (BIST)
and monitors the implemented hardware and software
mitigation measures, where the events were
categorized into three different risk levels of reaction:

Figure 2: Principle communication block diagram
for in-flight reconfiguration.
A configuration package, called boot image, for a
Xilinx SRAM based SoM consists of three parts, the
First-Stage-Bootloader (FSBL), the programmable
logic configuration bit stream (BIT) and the processor
executable application code (ELF). While the size of
the FSBL is typically around a few kilobytes, the size
of the programmable logic (PL) configuration BIT file
is device dependent and the processing system (PS)
executable ELF part is strongly application dependent.
The Xilinx Vivado tool offers the possibility to
generate a compressed configuration package, which
means a time saving of about 50% for uplink transfer.
The standard boot process requires the three partitions
packed together in a single file, the BOOT.bin.
However, with a modified FSBL implementation it is
possible to separate the three parts into different
upload packages. In this case, the BOOT.bin contains
the modified FSBL only, while the configuration bit
stream and the application code are placed in separate
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1: The minor risk level is typically triggered by
degradation effects or environmental variations
and is characterized by slightly higher current
consumption, noise level and artefacts in the
imaging sensors. Failures caused by SEEs may also
be classified as low priority faults, e.g. if a single
failure occurs in the PL within a triple modular
redundant (TMR) block that will not affect the
operation of the instrument. These effects allow
continuing of the measurement procedures. The
status will be announced as warning and no
reconfiguration will be initiated.
2. A major risk level requests and initiates a
reconfiguration procedure of the system. This
happens when a soft error occurs, that triggers
multiple TMR error flags, or internal
communication between PS and PL is affected and
produces errors in DMA-transfer. Other
indications may have corrupted TM/TC or
housekeeping data packets and inconsistencies in
memory cycle tests. Reliable operation is no longer
ensured as a result.
3. A critical error situation describes an error that can
lead to permanent damage to the system, e.g.
overcurrent situation caused by an SEL. Further
3

[35th] Annual
Small Satellite Conference

conditions can be initiated by a task crash of the PS
or a SEFI in the PL. In this case, the hardware
automatically shuts down the system, e.g. by
activating a trigger signal the EPS on the satellite
bus.
A RECONFIGURABLE SCIENCE PAYLOAD
The SRAM-based Xilinx Zynq-7000 System-onModule (SoM) architecture builds the system
controller of the scientific payload electronics. In this
work a AEC qualified COTS module TE0720-03-2IF
from Trenz company was selected. This module is
used in the automotive grade and is available in
various derivatives with different hardware
architectures. Individually adapted electronics can be
developed based on the module board-to-board
connectors and interfaces. In cooperation with the
vendor, the on-module DDR3 memory was replaced
by the compatible version with integrated ECC
(IME1G16D3EEB). An additional 4 GByte eMMC
memory is available and used as transfer memory. As
the XA7Z020 Zynq System-on-Chip (SoC) from
Xilinx holds a powerful processor system (PS) and a
programmable logic section (PL), it covers all the
functional requirements for the payload electronics.
The QSPI flash memory (25FL256S) is the primary
boot and configuration memory. At power up the PS
boots executable code from this device and loads the
PL configuration via the internal PCAP configuration
interface. The electronics is protected by additional
components around the SoM, shown in Figure 3.
To ensure a high reliability boot process, the firmware
and FPGA fabric configuration can be loaded from two
different boot memory devices. The QSPI flash
memory is the nominal (primary) boot device and an
external connected industrial grade SD card providing
a secondary boot image in redundancy. The Delkin
SE02SAMHL SD memory card is radiation tolerant

and qualified in a previous work up to a TID of 25 krad
[9].
Triggering the Reconfiguration and Dual Boot
Functionality
A supervisor circuit checks the operation and
reconfiguration of the system controller. For this
purpose, it is triggered by the BIST continuously. In
case of a software crash of the PS or a hardware failure
inside of the PL, the supervisor resets the system. We
are using the well-known µc-supervisor chip
MAX706, which is available as commercial part from
several manufacturer and also as a pin-compatible
radiation hardened part (e.g. 5962R1121304VXC). On
flight-models, we placing the radiation tolerant
ISL706 component that acts as a reliable part to secure
the system. The supervisor has internally two
functional blocks shown in Figure 4, the Power-OnReset (POR) and watchdog timer block and the PowerFail Indicator (PFI).
The first block is a power voltage monitor with POR
circuitry and a watchdog timer block (WDT) which
generates a reset after 1.6 s in case of missing alive
pulse. During normal operation, the POR generates a
stable power-up reset signal. The WDT input is driven
by a trigger signal, which is suppressed by the BIST
diagnostics block in case of major risks. It is a
combined signal produced by a separate software task
in the processing system (PS) and an independent logic
part inside the FPGA fabric (PL). Inside the PL a
digital counter generates the periodically trigger alive
signal. In addition, this counter is stimulated with a
command from the BIST in the PS. In both case that
the processor or the fabric stops working, the trigger
signal fails and a reset is generated by the WDT.
Therefore, the WDT starts the reconfiguration
procedure triggered by the following BIST diagnostics
events of:

a)

b)

Figure 3: Block diagram of functional and component blocks at SoM and their protection circuits and
interfaces around (a), reconfigurable science payload electronics in dual detector configuration with SD
card on bottom side (b).
Neubert
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 programmable logic (PL); in case one of the TMR
majority voters detects a mismatch in a triplicated
block.
 processing system (PS); a cyclic memory pattern
checks on random bit pattern fails, TC/DP- and
housekeeping data packages are inconsistent by
CRC, status flags and error states occur of
peripheral interfaces such as I2C, SPI and DMA
and configuration memory checks detects
discrepancies.
The second block of the supervisor is mainly used as
an early power fail indicator (PFI). We are using the
PFI circuit to generate a signal to select between the
nominal and secondary boot memory device. It is
based on a comparator (or Schmitt-trigger), which
generates a digital output signal based on an analog
input voltage. The RC components are used to switch
from nominal to redundant boot device after a defined
time constant. At power-up, the 'BootSelect' signal is
active high and indicates the SoM to boot from the
nominal boot device. The reset signal from the POR
block starts the booting process. In case the PS and PL
starts nominal, the system begins sending out the alive
signal, which triggers the WDT.

Figure 5: MD5 protected triplicated memory
devices used for redundant firmware storage and
repair.
Each configuration memory holds the binary boot
image and the correct MD5 hash tag in a separate file.
The MD5 is a cryptographic hash function and will be
used as a checksum to verify the data integrity [17].
Furthermore, the eMMC is used as upload and transfer
memory. During in-flight firmware update, the
received data blocks are stored here until the firmware
update is complete and checked. In Figure 5, the
eMMC therefore holds always a ‘golden image’ of the
firmware, beside of the two boot devices.
To ensure that all firmware memories have functional
firmware and that all memories have the same
firmware, an overall firmware system check is carried
out. At power up time, the software calls first a
‘System-checker’ procedure. This starts before the
main data acquisition task is initiated. First, the
firmware of the individual memories is checked
against their MD5# hash tags stored for each
independently. With this first step, the system-checker
validates that the memory devices are healthy and the
data is consistent. In a second step, the firmware copies
are compared with one another.

Figure 4: Functional blocks of the supervisor
circuit.
In case of a corrupted boot memory the SoM will not
generate an alive signal. With a time delay the WDT
generates a second reset pulse. In the meantime, the
'BootSelect' signal is active low due to the RC charging
circuit and selects the redundant boot memory.
On-board Firmware Check and Repair
The boot image is stored in three different
configuration memories to present a triple redundancy
of the boot code. Different technologies are chosen for
each memory to ensure highest reliability.
 QSPI
 SD-Card
 eMMC
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nominal (primary) boot device
redundant (secondary) boot device
transfer memory and ‘Golden
image’

In case of a discrepancy between the three
configuration memories, a repair procedure starts. The
boot image and MD5 hash tag of one of the consistent
memories is copied to the faulty one. The procedure is
always started at power up and can also be triggered
by a tele-command (TC) instruction. The status of the
configuration memories and their MD5 states are
monitored in the diagnostic function block (BIST) and
retrigger the WDT hardware, and is part of the regular
housekeeping structure. The Figure 6 shows the
complete system-check and repair sequence.
All the checking and repair functions are protected
with a timeout functionality. In case of a defective
memory device, (e.g. QSPI could not be erased or
programmed) the operation is cancelled after a timeout
time and this device is taken out of the repair flow.
Only in the worst case, when both configuration
devices are electronically defective, the system cannot
be started at all. To avoid this, we are using a radtolerant, single level cell, SD-Card that is switched off
during normal operation. Holding the SD-Card in cold
5
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spare, we further increase the reliability of the
configuration system [18].

Update Protocol
For the communication, we specified a customized,
small protocol stack, with protocol and port field,
different destinations and sub-protocols for data
handling. The design follows the typical network
transport model, supports several MAC-layer
interfaces and offers flexibility during the
development phase and modularity in case of different
satellite bus interfaces.

Figure 7: Header structure containing addressing,
protocol and port information.

Figure 6: Firmware verification and repair flow.

In-flight Firmware Update

The protocol is based on a 16-byte header containing
addressing, protocol and port information and is
similar to the CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) [13]. The
header contains eight bytes, which are used for
protocol/port specific parameters. A data block will be
declared by the length description (XLen). If XLen is
greater zero a data block with up to 16 Mbyte of data
will follow. The header and the data block are
protected with a CRC-8 checksum independently,
summarized in Figure 7. Each transfer is
acknowledged by a reply message with the same
structure of as the header.

For an in-flight firmware update, the new
configuration with the associated MD5 is temporarily
transferred from the OBC to the eMMC, that acts as a
transfer memory and is there verified against locally
calculated MD5. In the event of an error, the
temporarily created new firmware is deleted and a flag
is set, which informs the OBC and ground station
respectively, that the update must be carried out again.
If the new firmware was recognized as error-free, it is
duplicated together with the MD5 in the QSPI memory
and on the SD card. After the new firmware has been
successfully written to all memories, the temporarily
stored firmware on the transfer memory is renamed to
a permanent firmware copy in order to create further
redundancy and is used as the ‘Golden Image’. In
addition to the automatic update process, further TC
commands can be used to manually access the various
memories. Commands are available with which the
memory can be formatted, copied and verified. If the
automatic update function is no longer available due to
major hardware errors, a single memory can be
manually written with new firmware.

Neubert

Figure 8: Protocol stack and MAC layer.
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The protocol stack is designed for embedded systems,
written in C und and can be used in bare metal
programming or to run under FreeRTOS.
In our current instrument, we are using RMAP, ReConfiguration and Science Data port (Figure 8). With
RMAP, all setup parameters for the instrument can be
accessed via TC instructions. The science data port is
a downstream to transmit the scientific data. The ReConfiguration service is used for the in-flight upload
and reprograming of new firmware.
Update Process
A reconfiguration process is divided into an
initialization, an upload phase, a validation phase and
the programming phase.
The initialization phase informs the instrument about a
pending reconfiguration and sends the total length of
the new firmware image. During upload, the new
firmware image is transferred to the internal upload
buffer in sequential blocks. Each data block is secured
with a CRC checksum. In case of a wrong CRC, the
block will have retransmitted.
In the validation phase, the MD5 is send to the
instrument. The instrument calculates also the MD5 of
the internal upload buffer and compares with the
received MD5. The result is send to the OBC via the
reply message. CRC checksums of each block and the
final check with the overall MD5 will guarantee a valid
and error free data transmission.
If validation of the transferred firmware passed, a
programming message now initiates the transfer of the
internal upload buffer to the desired configuration
memory. The process flow is illustrated in Figure 9.
Initialization
- total size of firmware
to upload (Bytes)
Upload
- block-size and –number
in parameters
- data-CRC secured
- reply ACK/NAK
- on NAK: resend block
Validation
- send MD5
- generate local MD5
- validate MD5’s
- reply ACK / NAK
Program
- to which device
- auto-update
Poll Status and wait for
programming finished

Figure 9: Firmware update process diagram.
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In case of the QSPI memory, the programming cycle
can take significant longer compared to the SD card. A
system crash or unexpected power down, could lead to
an erased but not completely reprogrammed device.
Therefore, different configuration memories will be
programmed one after the other. This ensures that in
case of an unexpected system crash or power down,
the redundant boot device still holds a valid and
bootable boot image.
The different actions during the reconfiguration
process are selected by the Sub Command (Sub-CMD)
parameter inside the update protocol.If the long-term
radiation of the memories results in irreparable
failures, various update scenarios can keep the system
running. If the eMMC memory, used for upload new
firmware files fails, the new firmware files can directly
written to the SD card. After rebooting the system
verify the new firmware and copy it to all available
memories. When only SD card or QSPI memory is
available, the new firmware can be written directly to
this memory. The system verify procedure will skip
memories that are not usable.

TEST RESULTS
In order to reduce the amount of rework and further
functional tests a compliance test is performed first.
Depending on the test results, additional design tasks
and further testing might be necessary. The
compliance test screens design and methods
weaknesses under laboratory conditions. During the
test procedure, the reconfiguration software is
nominally functional, and the combination of
hardware and software can perform its basic mission
objectives.
During the test, various memory combinations were
disabled to simulate hardware defects, or memory
states were disturbed that lead to malfunctions in the
system and trigger BIST events. This verified the onboard firmware check and repair method, as well the
complete reconfiguration procedure. In addition to the
functional tests, environmental and radiation tests
were implemented to find potential weak points in the
design and their methods.
Environmental Tests
To consider temperature variations in orbit, thermal
cycling
tests
were
performed
screening
reconfiguration problems and thermal dependencies of
components. The tests were conducted in accordance
with the test conditions and requirements from the
satellite provider. Several temperature sensors were
attached to the electronics. The thermal chamber
temperature and the reconfiguration time during all
test cycles are illustrate in Figure 10 with the
corresponding operating times. Hot and cold starts
were carried out at +45 °C and -50°C respectively.
7
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This is 5 K above maximum and below the minimum
operational temperature condition. With the
components used in this design, no failures were
recognized during the reconfiguration cycling.
However, under cold condition the configuration
memory seems to be affect with thermal variations,
which causes longer erasing time cycles at lower
temperatures. These has to be taken into account
during in-flight reconfiguration during the mission.

expected dose for the targeted ARCADE mission. The
boards were powered and ran in a normal mode during
irradiation such that components are biased in a
representative condition. At predefined irradiation
steps, complete reconfiguration cycles with repair
procedure were initiated. If a malfunction inside the
electronics occurred, the irradiation steps were
interrupted to verify which component or module
failed. Table 1 summarize the test results.
Table 1: TID values of sensor electronics with
SoM and circuit boards.
ZYNQ - 7000 series

Figure 10: Thermal-cycling test temperatures and
QSPI configuration time cycle.
Radiation Tests
A gamma ray test was used for board level screening
regarding total ionizing dose effects of the SoM device
to qualify total mission lifetime, shown in Figure 11.
Two payload electronics were applied with different
kind of SoM modules, which were irradiated in
separate irradiation steps with incremental doses rates
of 1 and 3 krad per hour.

Reconfig.
cycle

TID / kRad

QSPI

SD_Card

eMMC

1

0.00

pass

pass

pass

2

0.93

pass

pass

pass

3

3.35

pass

pass

pass

4

5.10

pass

pass

pass

5

10.76

pass

pass

pass

6

13.76

pass

pass

pass

7

14.51

fail

pass

pass

8

18.71

fail

pass

pass

9

19.40

fail

pass

pass

The SoM module with Xilinx Zynq-7000 Series SoC
and their external components (e.g.) SD card were
fully functional. Only the configuration memory
(Cypress QSPI S25SL256) showed permanent failure
during reconfiguration cycles with a dose rate above
15krad. As a consequence, additional local aluminum
shielding (d = 1mm) was installed around the
configuration memory after the tests. During this
phase, the supervisor circuit activated the non-biased
SD card, which worked as a boot device from that
moment on and functioned reliably until the end of the
tests. Furthermore, no problems with the eMMC
storage were found during the test campaign.
Summary and Outlook

Figure 11: Radiation test setup with different SoM
electronics arranged one behind the other.
The irradiation tests were performed with a total
ionized dose of 20krad, which is four times the
Neubert

This work describes the reconfiguration strategy and
implementation for a reliable long-life electronics
based on a SoM architecture, which requires less
development resources and allows more scientists
access to space missions. Integrating most of the
functionality to control and reconfigure the science
instruments (e.g. hardware logic and software
routines) into a single module enables long-term
measurements and improves performance with less
power consumption. An essential measure is to ensure
reliable operation of the system at the expected
measurement times. Using a BIST diagnostics based
on the implemented mitigation measures by software
and hardware protection circuits an event-triggered
reconfiguration will initiated by rebooting the system.
Another important measure is the triple memory
8
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devices available directly on the SoM, with dual-boot
functionality controlled by an external supervisor
circuit that increases reliability. Firmware updates will
be available using adapted CSP protocol, verified each
with a MD5 checksum. An uploaded configuration
package is compressed and may separate into
partitions or programmable logic or application part at
the processing system to save uplink time. The
presented design is in use in a highly miniaturized limb
sounder as a case-study instrument to demonstrate the
feasibility of the SoM-based electronics. A final
analysis of the long-term behavior regarding SEU and
SEFI interactions is planned after the end of the
mission with the AtmoLITE instrument.
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